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This study addresses the simultaneous and diverse effects of differences in informal and formal 
institutions on cross-border alliances’ financial performance. We utilize data from 405 
microfinance institutions (MFIs), based in 74 developing countries, that have alliances with 
partners from developed countries. We find that the impact of informal institutional differences 
between MFIs and their cross-border partners is sigmoid-shaped, with performance first 
increasing, then declining, before improving again as informal institutional differences grow 
large. By contrast, formal institutional differences appear to be detrimental to MFIs’ 
performance. Consistent with our prediction, we find that MFIs’ cross-border experience 
moderates both formal and informal institutional effects.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Cross-border alliances typically involve the sharing and exchange of knowledge and resources 
between partners embedded in varied institutional contexts (Carlsson, 2006). In this paper, we 
extend this argument and draw performance implications for cross-border alliances. Past 
research on alliance performance has considered structural and relational aspects (Burt, 1992; 
Podolny, 1994; Rothaermel, 2001), while institutional differences among alliance partners 
have been considered largely from the narrow perspective of “cultural distance” (Kogut & 
Singh, 1988). Notwithstanding some notable exceptions (e.g., Filiou & Golesorkhi, 2016; 
Lavie & Miller, 2008), there is a dearth of knowledge on the distinct and potentially variable 
impact of informal and formal institutional differences on alliance performance. We redress 
this gap in the empirical context of vast institutional differences, where alliance partners come 
from developed and developing countries, respectively. 
Past research has shown that differences in the nature of institutions shape alliance 
partners’ attitudes and abilities to learn (Lyles & Salk, 1996; Parkhe, 1991; Simonin, 1999), 
which in turn affect their firms’ financial performance. In addressing the role of national 
institutional settings in cross-border alliances, we draw a fundamental distinction between 
informal and formal institutions, in line with institutional economics (North, 1990). This 
growing body of research has highlighted the coevolutionary nature of informal and formal 
institutions, while calling for their distinct treatment (e.g., Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Bowles, 
1998; Tabellini, 2008). In this paper, we argue that informal and formal institutional differences 
both have an impact on performance returns from cross-border alliances, however much their 
impact varies.   
To test our contention, we use a sample of 405 microfinance institutions (MFIs), based in 
74 developing countries, that have alliances with partners from developed countries. The 
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microfinance industry makes an interesting testing ground for our research agenda because of 
the many cross-border alliances between MFIs in developing countries and their partners in 
developed countries (Mersland, Randøy, & Strøm, 2011). Moreover, thanks to transparency 
guidelines introduced by international stakeholders like CGAP, which is a specialized 
microfinance branch of the World Bank, relevant and high-quality data are available for this 
industry, which is uncommon when it comes to data from developing economies in general 
(Beisland, Mersland, & Randøy, 2014).  
In line with our hypotheses we find that the impact from informal institutional differences 
is sigmoid-shaped, with performance first increasing, then declining, before improving again 
as informal institutional differences grow large. By contrast, we find a clear negative firm-
based performance effect from large formal institutional differences. A firm’s cross-border 
experience has a positive moderating effect on both informal and formal institutional 
differences.  
Our study contributes to the international business literature in several ways. First, we 
enhance our understanding of the impact of institutional differences on the performance of 
cross-border alliances. Past research has highlighted the role of informal institutions at the 
expense of formal institutions (Fey & Beamish, 2001), and often produced inconsistent results, 
at times showing that domestic alliances outperform cross-border alliances (Hennart & Zeng, 
2002; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996), while at other times finding that alliances between 
partners hailing from different informal institutional settings perform better than domestic 
alliances (Park & Ungson, 2001). Using a global dataset, our study provides comprehensive 
and clear results: formal institutional differences between cross-border alliance partners have 
a negative effect on performance, whereas the effect of informal institutional differences on 
performance depends on the extent of the differences between the partners. 
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Second, we contribute to the alliance literature by simultaneously addressing the impact of 
informal and formal institutions. To do so, we investigate a matrix of interorganizational 
partnerships exhibiting large variations in informal and formal institutions between cross-
border alliance partners across many heterogeneous countries (74 in this study) and continents.  
Third, our study contributes to the literature on nonlinear performance effects from 
internationalization. Specifically, we are motivated by the sigmoid performance effects found 
in studies on internationalization through wholly owned subsidiaries (Contractor, Kundu, & 
Hsu, 2003; Lu & Beamish, 2004), internationalization of alliance portfolios (Lavie & Miller, 
2008), and the effect of institutional differences on firms’ innovation returns from alliances 
(Filiou & Golesorkhi, 2016). By extending these past studies, we also shed light on the debate 
on the curvilinear effect of informal institutional differences on the cross-border activities of 
firms (e.g., Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007; Björkman, Stahl, & Vara, 2007; Stahl & Tung, 
2015). 
Fourth, by comparing the impact of informal and formal institutional differences as the key 
contextual elements, we contribute to the growing body of literature emphasizing the need for 
understanding the distinct attributes and economic outcomes of informal and formal 
institutions (e.g., Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Bowles, 1998; Tabellini, 2008). We strive to fill 
the gap in our understanding of the impact of informal and formal institutions on firms’ 
financial performance. In particular in the context of developing countries, where informal 
institutions have a prominent role in enabling or hindering business transactions and formal 
institutions provide weaker business support (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000; Verbeke & Kano, 
2013). We also provide an understanding of the impact of firms’ cross-border experience along 
each distinct dimension of informal and formal institutions. This gap especially exists in the 
context of alliances, a popular and important venue for economic and managerial transactions. 
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Finally, we contribute to the understanding of organizations working in a rapidly expanding 
global service industry (Ault & Spicer, 2014), whose financial returns from internationalization 
are yet to be thoroughly researched (one exception is Mersland et al., 2011). Moreover, we 
focus on the global microfinance industry, whose importance to economic and social 
development and modernization has been widely acknowledged, and which is deeply 
embedded in its respective home and host government systems, rendering national differences 
salient.1  
 
2.  ALLIANCES AND CONTEXTUAL DIVERSITY 
We employ the institutional perspective (North, 1990) to argue that informal and formal 
institutions demarcated at the national level (Edquist & Johnson, 1997) give rise to different 
sources of enablers and constraints in cross-border alliances and have distinct effects on firms’ 
financial performance. The differing nature of such institutions shapes partners’ attitudes and 
abilities to coordinate the liabilities of such differences and to leverage the financial potential 
of cross-border alliances. Specifically, we argue that the tacit (informal) or explicit (formal) 
nature of institutions engenders distinct effects on partners’ financial performance in cross-
border alliances.  Informal differences, typically unwritten, encompass socially shared rules 
and constraints (e.g., Sartor & Beamish, 2014; Sauerwald & Peng, 2013). Due to their tacit 
(Polanyi, 1966) and elusive nature, such differences have the potential to generate either the 
positive impact associated with, for example, resource complementarities, or the negative 
                                                          
1 Examples include the Dutch government-owned development bank FMO, with a microfinance portfolio of 8 
billion USD in 85 countries (www.fmo.nl), the Belgium BIO, a private-public (50/50) company with more than 
150 investments across the globe (www.bio-invest.be), and the Norwegian government-owned NORFUND with 




impact linked to conflicting values, norms, and practices between cross-border alliance partners 
(Parkhe, 1991). We posit that firms’ performance varies with the level of informal institutional 
differences, following a sigmoid (S-shaped) pattern. When a firm encounters cross-border 
partners that are marginally different, its performance is likely to increase due to the partners’ 
better understanding and appreciation of subtly different approaches; however, as differences 
increase, conflicts will surface, eroding performance. Once differences have reached a high 
level, awareness of the differences will emerge, and the urgency of collaboration will become 
apparent to the partners, prompting cooperation and improved performance.  
By contrast, formal institutional differences, codified and explicit in nature (Polanyi, 
1966), constitute “rules of the game” and are likely to produce differences between alliance 
partners that would be disruptive rather than complementary. More “incompatible” formal 
institutional pairs of cross-border alliance partnerships would increase the costs of conducting 
business, due to the unfamiliarity of each partner with the other partner’s institutional setting 
(Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2008). Once set, such “rules of the game” cannot be easily 
changed and there are no established mechanisms with which to facilitate the rapprochement 
of the disparate formal institutional sets of rules (North, 1990). 
Finally, we also argue that firms’ cross-border experience helps bridge both informal 
and formal institutional differences since experiential learning can capture both codified and 
tacit knowledge. The theoretical driver of our argument also incorporates insights from the 
literature on absorptive capacity and organizational learning (e.g., Levitt & March, 1988), and 
is in line with the prediction of the internationalization (Uppsala) paradigm (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977).2  
                                                          
2 The Uppsala internationalization model highlights how firm-based accumulated knowledge and learning 
reduce the cost of doing international business by overcoming “psychic distance,” and thus enhance the 
potential for profitable internationalization.  
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2.1.  The impact of informal institutional differences 
Informal institutions are systems of shared meanings, embedded in norms, values, beliefs, and 
the collective understanding of a society, that are not formulated into documented rules and 
standards (North, 1990). Furthermore, informal institutions consist of culture, which is 
responsible for shaping human cognition, perception, mental models, behavioral norms, 
traditions, customs, and belief systems. International business scholars have treated informal 
institution similar to culture (e.g., Estrin, Baghdasaryan, & Meyer 2009; Filiou & Golesorkhi, 
2016).    
Cross-border alliances typically involve knowledge exchange between partners, and 
this sharing and learning process is shaped by institutional differences (Lyles & Salk, 1996; 
Parkhe, 1991; Simonin, 1999). Differences in informal institutions may limit familiarity, and 
thus impair interfirm trust (Gulati, 1995), limit the scope of the convergence of values and 
goals that are needed to elicit positive attitudes, increase coordination costs, and impair 
resource exchange (Parkhe, 1991). However, evidence from existing empirical literature on the 
effect of informal institutional differences on the performance of cross-border alliances is 
highly inconsistent, showing a positive, negative, and/or no effect (Fey & Beamish, 2001; 
Hennart & Zeng, 2002; Parkhe, 1991; Park & Ungson, 1997). The inconsistent results have 
been attributed to a myriad of reasons, ranging from differences in theoretical frameworks to 
divergences in conceptualization and method (Shenkar, 2001). By and large the literature has 
considered informal institutional differences as detrimental to the performance of cross-border 
alliances (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997, Stahl & Tung, 
2015). Only recently has the literature explored the nonlinear effect of informal institutions on 
the performance of firms’ cross-border activities and emphasized the positive effect of informal 
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institutions (Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007; Björkman et al., 2007; Stahl & Tung, 2015).3 In 
acknowledging the growing ambivalent and inconclusive influences of informal institutional 
differences on the performance of cross-border alliances, we argue that the association between 
cross-border informal institutional differences and firms’ performance returns from such 
alliances may vary with the level of informal institutional differences. 
 At a low level of informal institutional differences, resource and skill exchange 
opportunities are more accessible to cross-border partners, making organizational learning 
more efficient and effective due to partners’ relative similarity. The conformities in perception 
and attitudes toward problem-solving enable partners to establish a shared meaning of the rules 
of engagement that underpin their collaboration (Ruigrok & Wagner, 2003; Lu & Beamish, 
2001; Schenkar, 2001). This facilitates knowledge and resource-sharing, inducing partners to 
focus on how they can combine their knowledge and take advantage of their respective 
competencies in order to foster performance (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Jiang & Li, 2008; 
Mowery et al., 1996). This is in line with the internationalization literature, specifically the 
Uppsala framework (rooted in Hymer’s “liability of foreignness”), which postulates that firms’ 
internationalization path is determined by their experiential learning (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977, 2009; Hymer, 1975). The assumption is that the internal information processing 
requirements for identifying and accessing network resources are less costly for firms whose 
countries share informal institutional settings (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Evidence from the 
literature also suggests that firms are better able to deal with informal institutional constraints 
                                                          
3 In addition, evidence from samples of UK-based biopharmaceutical and US-based software firms shows 
internationalization of alliance portfolios to have an S-shaped (sigmoid) impact on partners’ innovation and 
financial returns, respectively (Filiou & Golesorkhi, 2016; Lavie & Miller, 2008). However, their finding is 
different from ours. We believe that this difference may be due to the context of our study, i.e., cross-border 
alliances between partners from developing and developed countries, the disaggregation of informal and formal 
institutional differences, and/or the nature of the dependent variable. 
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on expansion into nationally different but proximate regions that share the same informal 
institutional settings (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; Peng, 2002; Peng & Delios, 2006).  
Past research also highlights how incremental increases in informal institutional 
differences lead to more perceptible, tacit differences between partners in their interpretation 
of and response to strategic and managerial issues (Chui, Lloys, & Kwok, 2002; Park & Ungson, 
2001). Such institutional differences are likely to increase coordination costs that could 
overshadow the marginal benefits of sharing resources and leveraging market opportunities 
with cross-border partners (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). As informal institutional 
differences increase conflict, the ensuing mistrust, lack of commitment, and ineffective 
interaction become more apparent, leading to lower cross-border alliance performance (Lane 
& Beamish, 1990; Sirmon & Lane, 2004). Moreover, informal institutional differences 
undermine unique opportunities and valuable network resources offered by partners. The 
insufficient overlap between the knowledge bases and national informal institutional 
backgrounds of partners impairs the ability of the partners to absorb and use valuable network 
resources (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Phene, Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Marsh, 2006).  
Informal institutional differences are difficult to fully perceive and recognize, making 
their conscious accommodation within existing alliance routines uncertain (Nicholson, Stepina, 
& Hochwarter, 1990; Park & Ungson, 2001). This is particularly relevant for tacit knowledge 
transfer, such as management beliefs, experiences, and business-process development 
(Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001). Increasing informal institutional differences hinders firms from 
implementing firm-specific practices conducive to collaboration as cross-border partners’ 
informal institutional differences make their attitudes and approaches to work incompatible 
(Björkman et al., 2007). In addition, Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) note that an elevated level 
of informal institutional differences in cross-border alliances reduce the effectiveness of 
collaboration, making the alliances less likely to survive. Inaccurate judgment of the factors 
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that hinder effective cooperation can trigger the application of unsuitable routines and 
inappropriate business- and alliance-specific practices (Heimeriks, 2010). Exploration of 
distant knowledge bases offered by one’s cross-border partners results in lower initial 
performance (Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007).  
The negative effect that informal institutional differences have on cross-border 
alliances increases with the differences. As the differences grow, partners can develop a mutual 
antagonism, at least up to an inflection point where the differences are large enough to draw 
attention to themselves and prompt cooperation efforts that will mitigate the negative effects 
and set in motion an effort to identify and leverage complementary skills and resources. Given 
the established tendency of firms to pay attention to and react to salient events (Levitt & March, 
1988), it is reasonable to assume that awareness of informal institutional differences will ignite 
only when the differences are considerable. 
Therefore, at an elevated level of informal institutional differences, firms are likely to 
both recognize the value of network resources and facilitate cooperation to enhance the 
assimilation and use of external knowledge, by investing additional time and alliance-specific 
resources to manage those differences (Dyer & Hatch, 2006). Such efforts can include training 
and monitoring (Shenkar & Zeira, 1992), consulting (Kale & Singh, 2007; Zollo & Winter, 
2002), and targeted staffing (Hennart & Park, 1993; Shenkar, Luo, & Yeheskel, 2008). The 
argument that informal institutional differences can lead to positive outcomes by creating 
opportunities in firms cross-border activities has been noted (Stahl & Tung, 2015). Lew, 
Sinkovics, Yamin, and Khan (2016) also find that considerable informal institutional 
differences do not amount to a liability in cross-border technology transfers. Based on previous 
literature and our arguments above we suggest that: 
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Hypothesis 1. The relationship between informal institutional differences and a firm’s 
performance in cross-border alliances is sigmoid (S-shaped), with performance first 
increasing, then declining, and finally increasing.  
 
2.2. The impact of formal institutional differences  
Formal institutional differences reflect the codified and explicit national variations in, for 
example, employment regulations, intellectual property regimes, business systems, rules and 
regulations, financial market operations, and fiscal and economic stability (North, 1990). Such 
differences can impose formidable barriers to cross-border alliances. Significant differences in 
the functioning of financial markets may introduce alliance conflicts, as partners will prioritize 
different types of outputs and different time horizons for achieving them (Park & Ungson, 
1997). Formal institutional diversity in the form of different legal systems gives rise to higher 
transaction and coordination costs, making the use of contracts as a control mechanism costly 
and ineffective (e.g., Chen & Chen, 2003). Such differences are also likely to inhibit the transfer 
of business practices between partners and constrain a firm’s ability to absorb and use valuable 
resources, by severely limiting its knowledge of distant partners’ resources and capabilities 
(Kostova & Roth, 2002). The complexity and diversity inherent in regulatory, legal, and 
economic factors have important implications for learning and coordination (Li, Qian, & Qian, 
2012). Substantial administrative, regulatory, and legal differences between cross-border 
partners lead to boundedly rational constraints on the management of alliances, increasing the 
costs of accommodating such differences to alliance management practices (e.g., Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2007). Owing to such dissimilarities, a firm’s ability to absorb and use valuable 
resources and knowledge of institutionally distant partners becomes constrained, undermining 
partners’ efforts to effectively share knowledge, adapt, and coordinate their value-adding 
activities (Meyer, 2001; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010; Tong, Reuer, & Peng, 2008). The 
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tangible and explicit attributes of formal institutions may allow partners to readily access 
information pertaining to the requirements of formal institutional settings and thus help alliance 
partners to negotiate the terms of their cooperation. However, this may be less relevant to cross-
border alliance partners from less compatible pairs of developed and developing nations, “less 
compatible” with respect to formal institutional settings, as there are risks of undesirable 
resource spillover and value misappropriation (Hamel, 1991; Lavie, 2006).4  Based on previous 
literature and our arguments above we suggest that: 
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between formal institutional differences and a firm’s 
performance in cross-border alliances is negative. 
 
2.3. The firm’s cross-border experience  
Thus far, we have argued that a firm’s performance is affected by the informal and formal 
institutional differences inherent in its cross-border alliances. However, a firm’s capacity to 
extract benefits from its alliances may also depend on its cross-border experience. A firm’s 
accumulated cross-border experience provides experiential knowledge in bringing gaps and 
identifying opportunities with partners from diverse informal and formal institutional contexts 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988). Firms need to learn about the institutions – both 
informal and formal – in order to enhance the success of foreign operations (e.g., Barkema & 
Drogendijk, 2007).  
In relation to informal institutional differences, a firm’s cross-border experience, 
specifically in forming and managing alliances, enables it to understand tacit differences and 
                                                          
4 We suggest a linear relationship for the formal institutions, whereas the impact of informal institutions is 
nonlinear (S-shaped). The main reason for this difference is that the firm can take organizational 
countermeasures when the informal institutional differences are large (training, etc.), whereas the same 
countermeasures are less effective in relation to formal institutional differences, which are less in the control of 
the firm (legal differences, etc.). 
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develop further means for exploring external opportunities arising from its alliances with its 
partners (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006).  We expect that a firm’s specific learning curve can 
provide it with a broader mind-set and a greater ability to respond to informal institutional 
differences and hence with institutional capital (e.g., Ethiraj, Kale, Krishnan, & Singh, 2005; 
Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Furthermore, prior research has identified cross-border experience 
as a distinct alliance capability element to overcome informal institutional liabilities (Barkema, 
Shenkar, Vermeulen, & Bell, 1997). This is also the logic behind the Uppsala model, which 
acknowledges that firms accumulate knowledge over time as they learn to make necessary 
adjustments in foreign markets (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009). Firms’ cross-border 
experience can help alliance partners to overcome relational impediments due to informal 
institutional differences.  This in turn enhances the scope of shared values and goals that are 
needed to elicit positive attitudes and facilitate social exchange in cross-border alliances 
(Parkhe, 1991). Based on previous literature and our arguments we suggest: 
 
Hypothesis 3a. A firm’s cross-border experience positively moderates the trajectory 
relationship, described in Hypothesis 1, between the firm’s performance and informal 
institutional differences. 
 
Although “psychic distance” is identified by Johanson and Vahlne as the key factor 
behind experiential learning,5 it precludes a consideration of specifically formal institutional 
differences. Therefore, to address formal institutional differences, the firm can also use its 
accumulated cross-border experience to decipher key elements of local formal institutions, 
thereby facilitating resource sharing and reducing the costs of coordinating activities (Das and 
Teng, 1998). Firms with limited cross-border experience have difficulty interpreting, 
                                                          
5 This composite factor later morphed into a singular capture of “cultural distance” (Shenkar, 2001). 
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understanding, and adapting to their cross-border partners’ formal institutions. Their own 
formal institutional context and mechanisms constrain their ability (and perhaps willingness) 
to change (Oliver, 1997). In such cases, firms have difficulty internalizing changes. By 
contrast, firms with substantial experience with cross-border partners can identify differences 
in formal institutional environments and learn how to utilize the comparative advantages 
embedded in the formal institutions of their partners (Parkhe, 1991). They can search out 
reliable partners, effectively anticipate contingencies, and design suitable contracts and other 
bonding mechanisms to discourage opportunism (Simonin, 1997). Based on previous literature 
and our arguments we suggest: 
 
Hypothesis 3b. A firm’s cross-border experience positively moderates the relationship, 
described in Hypothesis 2, between the firm’s performance and formal institutional differences.  
 
3. METHOD 
3.1. Data  
We use data from the microfinance industry to test our hypotheses. We argue that this global 
industry has several advantages for testing our hypotheses. Microfinance activities are quite 
homogeneous across countries (similar technology and financial services are used around the 
world), with an extensive matrix of interorganizational partnerships6 exhibiting large variations 
in informal and formal institutions between cross-border alliance partners across a large 
number of heterogeneous countries and continents (Mersland et al., 2011).7 The unusually 
                                                          
6 These are arrangements between microfinance institutions (MFIs) based in the developing world and their 
cross-border partners in the developed world. 
7 This result holds even after controlling for economic differences. 
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assessable marginal performance impact from informal and formal institutional differences is 
due to relatively uniform and transparent financial reporting within the industry (Beisland et 
al., 2014). The utility-like nature of MFIs’ operations, with typically few head-on competitors 
in the local market, enables the observation of suboptimal (costly) organizational arrangements. 
The lack of a stock market for corporate control of MFIs,8 and the fact that we do not study 
conventional firm-to-firm arrangements but rather agreements involving a donor or investor on 
the one hand and a funded organization on the other, imply that a suboptimal (“unprofitable”) 
alliance arrangement, in terms of informal and formal institutional differences between the 
partners, can be sustained over long periods. This in turn implies that we can observe larger 
performance variations (extremes) than what can be expected in a regular for-profit context 
with fierce competition.   
We utilize data on 405 MFIs (the unit of analysis in this study) in 74 countries. The 
MFIs were assessed from 1998 to 2010 by one of the five leading rating agencies specializing 
in microfinance: MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, and M-Cril. The MFIs were 
also assessed by professional third parties according to a transparency measure introduced in 
the late 1990s by international policy agents like the CGAP, a specialized microfinance branch 
of the World Bank (Beisland et al., 2014). A comparison of the five rating agencies’ rating 
methodologies reveals no major differences between their variables and the variables we use 
in our study, and thus supports the reliability of our dataset. Table 1 provides information on 
the proportion of MFIs in our dataset. In addition, we use a dummy variable to account for 
whether the MFIs in our dataset had cross-border alliances. The types of cross-border alliances 
we consider range from MFIs being part of an international microfinance network, to MFIs 
                                                          
8 In fact, only around 10 MFIs are listed worldwide (Briere & Szafarz, 2015). Using data from unlisted 
companies to study the research questions is in fact a strength of our study, considering the thin and sometimes 
nonexistent capital markets in low-income countries. 
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having an international debt (commercial or subsidized), to MFIs having an international 
partner – an investor or sponsor – who acted as the main initiator of the MFI See Appendix 1 
for descriptive information on the type and content of the MFIs’ relationships with their cross-
border partners. The MFIs in our dataset take a number of legal and organizational forms but 
all are either non-profit member-based cooperatives or for-profit shareholder-controlled firms. 
We do not include other microfinance providers, such as central banks, small savings and credit 
cooperatives, or development programs that offer microcredit solely for welfare.   
It can be argued that our dataset has a certain sample selection bias, since only rated 
MFIs are included. However, in practice, MFIs interested in engaging in cross-border 
partnerships and accessing funding need to present an external rating report as a credential 
before entering into negotiations. This applies in particular to younger MFIs without an 
international reputation. The dataset thus represents internationally oriented MFIs with the 
intention to practice microfinance in a business-oriented and transparent manner (Beisland et 
al., 2014). Moreover, we argue that data from the MFIs’ rating reports have some distinct 
advantages over the data from commonly used MFI databases (e.g., the general MIX Market 
database: www.mixmarket.org). First, the data contain valuable information, e.g., on the MFI’s 
international initiator and its network membership, that is unavailable from other sources. 
Second, the data are not self-reported, as is the case in MIX Market; instead, a third party – the 
rating agency –collects and verifies the data. Third, MIX Market data contain relatively more 
information on very large MFIs, which are not subject to microfinance rating reports because 
they are rated by traditional agencies such as Standard & Poor’s. Thus, the bias toward large-
sized MFIs in the MIX Market data is less prevalent in our dataset, which has a wide size 
distribution (see Table 2). In addition, we employ random effects estimations that assume that 
the unobserved heterogeneity error term is uncorrelated with each independent variable. We 
also run Harman’s single factor test to detect common bias method as a source of endogeneity 
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(see Sharma, Yetton, & Crawford, 2009). It must be noted that our dataset is the up-to-date 
version of a dataset used in several prior studies (e.g., Mersland et al., 2011; Mersland & Strøm, 
2010).   
__________________________ 
Insert Table 1 and 2 about here 
___________________________ 
 
3.2. Dependent variable 
We measure the MFIs’ financial performance (the dependent variable) in terms of the real 
inflation-adjusted return on assets (ROA). We also use the ratio of operational expenses to 
assets to measure financial performance (Mersland & Strøm, 2010). Whereas costs and income 
drive the ROA, operational costs are of interest, as the competitive environment of the MFI 
does not “distort” them. This is important since the competitive environment can vary 
significantly from country to country (Assefa, Hermes, & Meesters, 2013). However, the 
results for operating costs were in line with the results for ROA that we report in this paper. 
The unreported results are available upon request. ROA is our main indicator of financial 
performance because it “summarizes” an MFI’s financial success and has been used in prior 
studies (e.g., Mersland et al., 2011).  
We recognize that most MFIs operate with a “double bottom line” approach, striving 
to achieve social returns as well as financial returns (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). 
Interestingly, past research shows that the legal status of the organization, whether for-profit 
or non-profit, does not impact its ROA (Mersland & Strøm, 2008). A common denominator 
across MFIs is that they are all pushed in the direction of cost efficiency. Nevertheless, as 
indicated by Mersland and Strøm (2010), the MFI’s main financial challenge is related to its 
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operational costs and financial performance, which are prerequisites for long-term social 
returns.9 Given the fact that only about 10 MFIs worldwide (Briere & Szafarz, 2015), and only 
two in our dataset, are stock exchange-listed, we can’t use market-based performance measures 
(e.g., Tobin’s q). In fact, the use of listed firms could potentially have brought in other biases 
since capital markets in low-income countries, especially in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, are 
often unrepresentative, thin, and sometimes nonexistent (as in the case of African firms; see 
Hearn, 2016).  
3.3. Independent variables  
Culture is an important reflection of national informal institutions, representing shared values 
and non-codified standards, and reflects a socially constructed reality shaping cohesion, logics 
of action, and coordination among individuals within the society (North, 1990). Using 
indicators of national cultural differences based on Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index, previous 
studies have captured the role of informal institutions in raising obstacles to cross-border 
alliances (e.g., Filiou & Golesorkhi, 2016). However, the use of cultural distance based on 
Kogut and Singh’s index has raised widespread concern (Shenkar, 2001) about symmetry, 
illusions of equivalence, and the adequacy of the statistical techniques used to construct and 
validate Hofstede’s original dimensions of culture on which Kogut and Singh’s index is based, 
among other things (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & De Luque, 2006; Shenkar, 2001). 
To address these concerns, we also apply two alternative cultural indices to capture informal 
institutional differences: one based on the GLOBE study (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, 
                                                          
9 We also run a robustness check using a measure of social outreach performance (accounting for the dual 
mission of MFIs) proxied by the average loan size, where a positive social outreach implies a lower average 
loan size for MFIs. Although using average loan size as a proxy for poverty outreach has been criticized 
(Armendáriz & Szafarz, 2011; but see Mersland et al., 2011), researchers have so far not come up with a better 
alternative measure for social performance. The unreported results confirm our hypotheses and are available 
upon request.  
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& Gupta, 2004; Javidan & House, 2001) and the other based on the World Values Survey 
(WVS). The GLOBE study shows nine indices based on recent surveys and uses contemporary 
empirical techniques in their construction and validation (Javidan et al., 2006). The “practices” 
indices of the GLOBE study are preferred to the “values” indices because MFIs’ cross-border 
partners are more likely to be concerned with the informal institutional indices that they 
actually encounter in the MFIs’ countries.10 In addition, it has been argued that both Hofstede’s 
study and the GLOBE study might capture marginal rather than absolute levels of values 
(Maseland & Van Hoorn, 2009), which also suggests using the “practices” indices (Estrin et 
al., 2009) 
In addition, we use the WVS’s cultural dimensions of traditional/secular-rational and 
survival/self-expression (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, 
Halman, & Luijkx, 2004) to construct an alternative informal institutional measure (e.g., 
Brouthers et al., 2008; Salomon & Wu, 2012). This choice was based on the sampling, 
timelines, scale, and validity of the WVS in its focus on normative and cognitive national 
culture. Compared to Hofstede (2001) and House et al. (2004), the WVS captures the national 
cultural characteristics of the overall population of a country, instead of just those of managers 
of corporations. Given the complexity of the concepts that are measured under the umbrella of 
national culture, the more diverse set of respondents sampled by the WVS may provide 
additional information. Furthermore, the WVS has been applied to a wider range of fields, such 
as institutional economics (e.g., Tadesse & White, 2008), sociology (e.g., Curtis, Baer, & 
Grabb, 2001), and international business (e.g., Salomon & Wu, 2012), establishing it as a 
validated and reliable construct. 
                                                          
10 We obtain similar results using “value” indices. 
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Overall, in operationalizing informal institutional differences, we measure informal 
institutional differences by using cultural differences between alliance partners’ countries of 
origin.  We use Kogut and Singh’s (1988)11 index of  cultural distance – based on Hofstede’s 
(1980) four dimensions of culture: uncertainty avoidance, individuality, tolerance of power 
distance, and masculinity-femininity12 – as a robustness test in Appendix 2. We then calculate 




kj  – EC km  /n , where EC k  is the measure of the k-th GLOBE cultural indicator, for k=1 to 9, 
c  is cross-border partner j’s country of origin, m is the MFI’s country of origin, and n  is the 
number of partners involved with MFI i in year t. The methodological concerns related to the 
sigmoid nature of the relationship tested by the informal institutional differences13 imply that 
we have to reduce the number of variables (Hair, Babin, Money, & Samouel, 2006). Therefore, 
we conduct a principal component analysis (PCA) of the informal institutional differences 
based on the nine indicators of GLOBE with varimax rotation. The exploratory factor analysis 
suggests that the theoretical constructs indeed load onto one factor. The one-factor solution 
also shows a high level of reliability with a Cronbach alpha of 0.886 and an eigenvalue of 
6.116. Various debates can be found in the literature about how many factors are to be retained 
(Hair et al., 2006). According to the Kaiser criterion, eigenvalues >1 should be retained as 
                                                          
11 Kogut and Singh (1988) designed an overall index that defines the cultural differences between a given nation 






  4/ V/)( 2 iiuij II  . 
12 We acknowledge that recent discussions in the literature question such a notion of distance and argue that 
friction better captures the impact of informal institutional differences (Shenkar, 2001; Shenkar, Luo, & 
Yeheskel, 2008). Nevertheless, empirical studies invariably employ distance-based constructs and measures and 
their findings indicate that the various proxies for such differences are broadly consistent (e.g., Dow & Larimo, 
2011; Estrin et al., 2009). 
 
13 These include high multicollinearity, the degree of freedom in the regression models, and the correlated 





separate factors. However, this criterion might underestimate the number of factors (Hair et al., 
2006). Given that the result of this factor analysis is in line with previous studies (e.g., Gaur & 
Lu, 2007; Mitton, 2008), one single solution seems suitable. Similarly, we use the same 
approach to operationalize informal institutional differences based on the WVS by subtracting 
the MFI’s WVS aggregated score from its cross-border partner’s score.  
We use items selected from the economic freedom index developed by the Heritage 
Foundation, as indicators of the presence of formal institutions and the openness of the 
institutional environment (Berggren & Jordahl, 2005; Meyer, Estrin, & Bhaumik, 2009; Stroup, 
2007). The index provides aggregated annual values, including evaluations of countries in 
terms of business activity, trade, investment, labor markets, financial freedom, corruption, 
property rights, and the like. This index is highly correlated with other proxy measures, such 
as the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum) and World Bank database 
indicators (Hanke & Walters, 1997; Berger & Bristow, 2009). Following insights from Lavie 




EI −EI │/n  , where EI  is the measure of the k-th indicator, for k=1 to 10, c  is 
cross-border partner j’s country of origin, m is the MFI’s country of origin, and n  is the 
number of partners involved with MFI i in year t. For each MFI in our sample, we determine 
its cross-border partners’ identities and their countries of origin. We then construct a composite 
measure based on the factor score derived from the 10 indicators, which we found to be highly 
correlated.14 The literature also indicates that formal institutional indicators generally tend to 
overlap with each other (Mitton, 2008; Dow & Larimo, 2011). We use principal components 
                                                          
14 The correlation matrix is available upon request. 




and factor analysis with varimax rotation, which produced a single factor score with an 
eigenvalue of 7.82 and a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91. 
The final tested independent variable is the MFI’s cross-border experience. As stated 
previously, the MFIs in our dataset have been assigned international ratings, and the industry 
is highly global, with most MFIs having had some form of cross-border support since start-up, 
as noted in Appendix 1. Therefore, we use as a proxy for an MFI’s cross-border experience the 
cumulative number of years since it started its microfinance activities, lagged by one year 
(Lavie, Kang, & Rosenkopf, 2011). Following past research recognizing that the marginal 
value of each incremental unit of experience declines as overall experience increases, we 
transform this variable into its natural logarithm (e.g., Goerzen & Beamish, 2005). Capturing 
cross-border experience with an MFI’s age is a reflection of the extent of the 
internationalization of this industry (Mersland et al., 2011) and in particular the MFI 
founder(s’) role in creating cross-border connectivity (Randøy, Strøm, & Mersland, 2015). As 
a robustness check we test our hypotheses on a subsample of MFIs with only cross-border 
initiators (indicating the MFI’s age to be equivalent to the cross-border influence and 
experience of its founders from its inception). The results confirm our predicted hypotheses.15  
To further isolate the effects of informal and formal institutional differences on MFIs’ 
performance, we control for the diversity of cross-border partners’ countries of origin (Goerzen 
& Beamish, 2005; Lavie & Miller, 2008), using an inverted Herfindahl index. For each MFI i 
in year t, we use the formula 1−  
15
1c
(n /n ) , where n  is the number of partners of 
MFI i that originate from country c, and n  is the total number of cross-border partners of MFI 
i in year t. This composition demonstrates the dominance of developed economies as MFIs’ 
                                                          







cross-border partners. A high value for this measure would suggest that an MFI’s partners were 
globally dispersed. Figure 1 shows the distribution of MFIs’ cross-border partners’ countries 
of origin. We control for whether MFIs have a shared language with their cross-border partners 
using a dummy variable, in line with the argument that it is a one-off effect. The dummy 
variable is assigned a value of 1 when MFIs and their cross-border partners have a shared 
language and 0 otherwise. 
We also apply the following organization-specific MFI control variables that have been 
included in recent microfinance performance research (Cull, Demigüc-Kunt, & Morduch, 
2007; Mersland et al., 2011): type of ownership, assets (size), and whether or not assets are 
regulated by banking authorities. This information is from rating reports, i.e., the main data 
source we use. Further, given the high degree of variation in the economic environments of our 
MFIs’ countries of origin, we use country variables to reduce misspecification of MFIs’ 
performance (e.g., Mersland & Strøm, 2010). This includes the country’s human development 
index (HDI), which is a composite country index covering life expectancy, education, and 
income (GDP per capita). HDI and GDP per capita are taken from World Bank and United 
Nations Development Program, respectively. Table 3 provides a summary of all the variables. 
 
_______________________________ 








Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis, and the correlation 
matrix; see also the variance inflation factors of the baseline models in Appendix 3. None of 
the correlation coefficients is of high magnitude (Kennedy, 2008).16 The MFIs’ mean values 
of informal and formal institutional differences (GLOBE) in cross-border alliances are 2.05 
and 14.36, respectively. Table 5 reports the generalized least squares estimation in the panel 
data, with missing values subject to list-wise deletion, and ROA as the dependent variable. We 
chose the random effects model due to the nature of the study variables, which are mainly time 
invariant, and because our robustness check (Hausman, 1978; test Prob>chi2 = 0.055) revealed 
random effects to be appropriate to test the effects of informal and formal institutional 
differences on the MFIs’ performance. Models 1 and 5 are the baseline models with the linear 
terms of the GLOBE and WVS measures, respectively. We test Hypothesis 1 (using the 
GLOBE and WVS measures) and Hypothesis 2 in Models 2 (6) and 3 (7), in which we test for 
a sigmoid relationship between informal institutional differences and MFIs’ performance, 
respectively, by adding GLOBE and WVS squared terms in Model 2 (6) and GLOBE and WVS 
cubic terms in Model 3 (7). Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b are tested by introducing the 
interaction effect of cross-border experience on informal institutional differences (the GLOBE 
and WVS measures) as well as on formal institutional differences in Model 4 (8) respectively. 
Models 9 and 10 serve as the full models with the GLOBE and WVS measures, respectively. 
We conclude with Wald tests on the significance of each model against the baseline models.  
________________________ 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
___________________________ 
                                                          
16 It must be noted that we trim outliers from the dataset. For example, MFIs with more than 50 years of 
experience were removed from our dataset, given that MFIs are nearly all young organizations; our observations 
center on MFIs with almost ten years of experience on average.  
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Models 1 and 5 indicate that informal institutional differences have a negative and significant 
effect on MFIs’ performance. While both the GLOBE and WVS measures are significant at 5 
percent, we expect a nonlinear relationship to better capture the effect of informal institutional 
differences on MFIs’ performance at each level of difference. The joint test of the linear, 
squared, and cubic terms of informal institutional differences, as demonstrated by the GLOBE 
and WVS measures, are significant at the 1 (5) percent level in Model 3 (7). This supports the 
hypothesized sigmoid relation between informal institutional differences and MFIs’ financial 
performance. In addition, the Wald chi-square statistic indicates that the inclusion of the cubic 
terms significantly improves our model’s fit. Models 9 and 10 (the full models) also confirm 
these results. Overall, these results support Hypothesis 1, with a significant effect of the 
positive linear term, the negative squared term, and the positive cubic term. Our estimated 
relationship suggests that the minimum ROA level is at the 2.150 point of informal institutional 
differences (GLOBE), which corresponds to a negative ROA of 0.450 and the maximum ROA 
at the 0.971 point of informal institutional differences, which corresponds to a positive ROA 
of 0.236 (see Figure 2).17 To contextualize our results, the informal institutional difference 
between an MFI from, say, Mexico and a French cross-border partner is 2.363, while the 
difference between a Mexican MFI and a US partner is 1.136. Our results suggest that, at low 
levels of informal institutional differences, MFIs are better able to reap the benefits of exposure 
to different cultures, due to the tacit and elusive nature of informal institutional characteristics 
that makes subtle differences difficult to decipher and acknowledge. At higher levels of 
informal institutional differences, our interpretation is that MFIs become more aware of the 
sources of difference while being unable, or unwilling, to redress the moderate negative effect, 
while at the highest levels of differences MFI are willing to make explicit investments in 
                                                          
17 The graph of the WVS on the MFI’s performance also confirms the hypothesized S-shaped pattern. 
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alliance management practices and other resources to enhance financial performance returns 
from cross-border alliances.18 Our findings is in line with the international business literature, 
highlighting that the learning capacity of the firm will be greatest when the overlap between 
the firms’ cultural knowledge is fairly large, yet small enough to stimulate learning (e.g., 
Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007). Furthermore, our results are also in line with the organizational 
learning literature, suggesting that firms that move away from their knowledge-base of 
experience could encounter short-term performance decline, however, enhanced learning and 
better performance in future expansions (e.g., Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). In 
all the models discussed above, we find support for Hypothesis 2 in the negative and significant 
relationship between formal institutional differences and MFIs’ financial performance (at 1 and 
5 percent levels). We believe that this negative relationship is caused by the costs of forming 
cross-border alliances with partners embedded in very different formal national institutions, 
and that it is also reflected in the average formal institutional difference the MFIs confront with 
their cross-border partners, namely, 14.36 in Table 4. MFIs’ investments may increase with the 
customization of products and technologies to match cross-border partners’ banking 
preferences and standards from the developed countries. Filiou and Golesorkhi (2016) also find 
that increased formal institutional differences have a negative impact on firms’ innovation 
returns from cross-border alliances. Furthermore, the risk of undesirable resource spillover and 
misappropriation of value (Hamel, 1991; Lavie, 2006) increases with the disparity in economic 
and financial development. National institutions affect transaction costs and the efficiency of 
the business exchanges in MFIs’ cross-border alliances, and such institutions are seen as the 
main driver of MFIs’ financial stability (Ahlin, Lin, & Maio, 2011). We also find support for 
                                                          
18 We conduct an extensive set of robustness tests, such as testing our hypotheses on random samples and 
running semiparametric regressions for panel data. The unreported results of these robustness tests provide 
further support for our hypothesized relationships between informal institutional differences and MFIs’ 
performance returns from cross-border alliances. 
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Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b, revealing two positive and significant (at 5 and 1 percent 
levels) interaction effects from MFIs’ cross-border experience on informal and formal 
institutional differences, using models with the same interaction terms as in Model 4 (8). These 
results support the argument that organization-specific learning from accumulated cross-border 
experience contributes to MFIs ability to bridge informal and formal institutional differences 
with its cross-border alliance partners, hence improving MFIs’ financial performance (e.g., 
Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007, Barkema et al., 1997). Figure 3 depicts this relationship.  
___________________________ 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
___________________________ 
 
Turning to the performance effects of the control variables, shown in Table 5, first, the variable 
attesting to the diversity of the cross-border partners’ countries of origin exhibits a negative 
and significant sign at the 5 percent level in Model 2. This indicates that as the number and 
diversity of cross-border partners in an MFI’s portfolio of alliances increase, the ability of the 
MFI to coordinate and access its partners’ networks diminishes. However, our results also 
suggest that an MFI’s cross-border experience can improve its learning and absorptive 
capabilities for managing informal and formal institutional differences, enhancing performance 
returns from cross-border alliances. Regulation of the MFIs by banking authorities has a 
negative and significant impact, at the 5 percent level in Model 1 and 5. We find no significant 
impact of the MFI’s ownership type on its performance, which is in line with previous 
microfinance research indicating that type of ownership has negligible impact on MFI 
performance (e.g., Mersland & Strøm, 2008). In most models, the MFI’s size (proxy for its 
assets) exhibits a positive and significant effect on its performance, which indicates the 
existence of organizational scale economies in microfinance banking, as previously reported 
by Hartarska, Shen, and Mersland (2013). We also find a positive and significant effect of the 
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language variable at the 5 percent level in Models 1, 5 and 8, suggesting that MFIs enhanced 
their performance by sharing a language with their cross-border partners. This is in line with 
international business research where it has been found, for example, that a shared language 
improves the absorptive ability of firms’ employees to share globally relevant company 
information such as technological development, financial data, health and safety procedures, and 
employment conditions (e.g., Piekkari, Welch, & Welch, 2014). Finally, we find a low HDI for 
the MFI’s home country negatively affects the MFI’s performance at the 5 percent significance 
level in Models 5 and 10. This finding illustrates the challenges involved in operating 
businesses in poor countries. Overall, the results from Table 5 show the regression 
specifications to have acceptable explanatory and predictive abilities. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study we examine financial performance returns from cross-border alliances from an 
institutional perspective. We highlight that the nature of institutions, both formal and informal, 
and the extent of informal institutional differences are important in understanding the 
intricacies of cross-border alliances and firms’ financial returns. We find support for the notion 
that informal and formal institutions are of an implicit and explicit character, respectively, with 
different impacts on partners’ abilities to address and negotiate such institutional differences 
with their cross-border alliance partners. Our study affirms Shenkar’s (2001) contention that 
the impact of informal institutional differences can be nonlinear. We also show that this pattern 
does not extend to differences between formal institutions, reaffirming the dissimilar nature of 
informal and formal institutional differences, as claimed in both classical sociology and 
institutional economics. We argue that the theoretically motivated and observed sigmoid 
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pattern of the relationship between informal institutional differences and firm performance 
enriches the existing literature on cross-border alliances. 
Furthermore, we provide empirical support for the notion that informal institutional 
differences can have marginal positive as well as negative effects, compounded as a net 
sigmoid effect. This notion is motivated by the fact that cross-border alliances can help MFIs 
to access possible complementarities or value-adding resources, as well as be a source of 
disruption to MFIs (Stahl & Tung, 2015). Specifically, we argue that the realization of positive 
as well as negative outcomes depends, among other factors, on the extent of the observed 
differences.  
 We demonstrate that firms can leverage their cross-border experience to moderate the 
performance impact of informal and formal institutional differences. We suggest that firms can 
capitalize on experiential learning to form and manage cross-border alliances, specifically 
utilizing institutional experience and capabilities (Barkema et al., 1997; Cyert & March 1963). 
To our knowledge, our study is among the first to consider the impact of organizational 
experience on institutional heterogeneity.  Our study hypothesizes and observes positive 
moderating effect of firms’ cross-border experience on both informal and formal institutional 
differences, which extends the findings of previous studies in this area (e.g., Lavie & Miller, 
2008; Kale & Singh, 2007). Another relevant study is that of Hall (1959, p. 156) who builds an 
experience-based model of institutional adjustment. Our findings   are particularly appealing 
to firms based in developing countries, whose accumulated cross-border experiences are 
commonly less developed.  Experiential knowledge could assist such firms in establishing a 
range of alliance routines to manage cross-border alliances and to overcome potential frictions 
and coordination problems due to institutional differences. In turn increasing the potential 
financial sustainability of cross-border alliances and subsequent social outreach.   
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 It is a commonly observed fact that cross-border partnerships between 
organizations in the developed world and partners in the developing world are on the rise 
(Economist, 2014)19 and our study addresses this phenomenon. Specifically, our study has 
managerial implications for strategy-making, institutional adaptation, and international 
business, as called for by Jennings, Greenwood, Lounsbury, and Suddaby (2013). A first 
implication of our study is that “informal institutional due diligence” may not be sufficient 
for handling cultural gaps, and that firms should put continuous monitoring in place in order 
to identify inflection points (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). A second managerial implication 
is that enhancing performance by accessing diverse knowledge bases in cross-border 
alliances depends on the type of institutional differences being studied. This suggests a need 
to pay close attention to such differences as a criterion for selecting cross-border alliance 
partners as well as for a criterion developing adaptations to such differences as an important 
alliance capability (e.g., Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004). Thus, we 
recommend a more informal institutionally targeted approach when cross-border actors seek 
partners in developing countries. We argue that an institutional perspective on MFIs’ 
partnerships can enhance our understanding of what drives their cross-border alliance 
performance. 
 In acknowledging the debate on the constructs of informal and formal institutional 
differences (Berry, Guillen, & Zhou, 2010; Brewer & Venaik, 2011; Luo & Shenkar, 2011), 
we have attempted to identify informal and formal institutional differences by means of 
disaggregating them. However, in identifying the effect of each individual index of informal 
and formal institutions, we have faced challenges of conceptualization and methodology. In 
                                                          




future research, it may be worthwhile to explore new directions of how to measure and 
disaggregate individual indices of institutions (e.g., Dow & Larimo, 2011). For instance, it 
may be worthwhile to explore the extent to which informal institutions share similarities with 
the concept of culture, in order to compare whether these constructs produce similar or 
divergent results. Another possible fruitful avenue for future research is to explore the 
motivations underlying the formation of cross-border alliances (especially between partners 
in very dissimilar countries), as well as in what direction and by what mechanism knowledge 
is transferred between partners. 
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Appendix 1: MFIs’ cross-border dimensions: Descriptive statistics 
 
    Mean Std. Min Max  
International initiator   0.38%  0.485  0.000  1.000   
International commercial debt 0.41% 0.491  0.000  1.000   
International subsidized debt  0.51% 0.500  0.000  1.000   
International network member  0.33% 0.471  0.000  1.000   
 
The descriptive statistics for MFIs’ cross-border partners in Appendix 1 show that as many as 
38% of MFIs have an international initiator, 41% have an international commercial debt, 
51% have an international subsidized debt, and 33% are members of a recognized 




Appendix 2: The test for a sigmoid relationship between informal institutional differences 
and MFIs’ financial performance returns from cross-border alliances based on Kogut and 
Singh’s index and the uncertainty avoidance dimension of Hofstede. 
 
We computed the informal institutional difference, based on the Kogut and Singh’s (1988) 
index (henceforth referred to as KS) to provide a comparison with our other measures of 
informal institutional differences reported in Table 5. In addition, in acknowledgment of 
Shenkar (2001), who argues for the disaggregation of cultural dimensions, we also calculated 
the difference between MFI m and its cross-border partner’s country cj as the absolute 
differences of each of Hofstede’s dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individuality, masculinity, femininity, long-term/short-term normative orientation, and 
indulgence/restraint. Our preliminary results highlighted that only one indicator was 
significant, namely, uncertainty avoidance indicator (henceforth referred to as UAI). Therefore, 
we also tested the sigmoid pattern of H1 using this indicator. Overall, the results confirm the 
sigmoid relationship between informal institutional differences and MFIs’ financial 
performance from cross-border alliances. Results of the random effects model with ROA as 
the dependent variable and KS and UAI variables are reported below. 
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ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Cons 1.855 3.713 1.281 -0.283 0.689 1.479 -0.208 -0.675 1.652 -0.746 
 (0.136) (0.215) (0.084) (0.085) (0.101) (0.101) (0.077) (0.113) (0.164) (0.099) 
Regulation -0.040** -0.008 0.055 0.001 -0.028* -0.028 -0.015 -0.05 -0.056* -0.050 
 (0.018) (0.002) (0.037) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.032) (0.021) 
Type -0.012 -0.011 0.008 -0.011 0.019 -0.012 0.002 0.003 -0.053 0.003 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.043) (0.021) 
Assets 0.045** 0.006** 0.127** 0.045** 0.074** 0.045** 0.035*** 0.020** 0.099** 0.101** 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.045) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
Cross-border MFI 0.081 0.022 0.014* 0.032 0.035 0.006 0.013* 0.006 0.212 -0.002 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.031) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.029) (0.071) 
Cross-border diversity -0.167 -0.099 0.134* -0.189 -0.078 -0.019** 0.106 -0.316 0.076 0.088 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.077) (0.116) (0.088) (0.055) (0.086) (0.254) (0.061) (0.072) 
Language  0.189** 0.039 0.041 0.047 0.025** 0.028 0.056** 0.178** 0.172 0.191 
 (0.051) (0.022) (0.032) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.046) (0.051) (0.058) 
HDI 0.055 0.089 0.102 0.068 -0.086 -0.101 -0.167 -0.048 0.063* -0.097* 
 (0.045) (0.099) (0.083) (0.031) (0.069) (0.099) (0.178) (0.027) (0.052) (0.063) 
Formal inst. diffs. -0.013*** -0.031*** -0.061** -0.046** -0.078*** -0.066** -0.045*** -0.033** -0.068*** -0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.015) (0.032) (0.045) (0.055) (0.033) (0.002) (0.059) (0.002) 
MFI cross-border exp. 0.041 0.061 0.040** 0.012 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.0132* 0.056 
 (0.023) (0.041) (0.012) (0.009) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.011) (0.023) (0.018) 
KS  -1.246*** 1.168** 1.234*** -1.206**     1.146***  
 (0.059) (0.012) (0.071) (0.078)     (0.036)  
Square values of KS  -2.431*** -2.587**      -2.615**  
  (0.023) (0.033)      (0.067)  
Cubic values of KS   1.104*      1.109*  
   (0.004)      (0.008)  
UAI     -1.456*** 1.111*** 1.159*** -1.354***  1.143** 
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     (0.046) (0.065) (0.051) (0.077)  (0.089) 
Square values of UAI      -2.105** -2.487**   -2.671** 
      (0.032) (0.027)   (0.128) 
Quadratic values of UAI      1.120**   1.101** 
       (0.083)   (0.074) 
Experience* formal inst. diffs.   0.096**    0.078** 0.067** 0.058** 
    (0.023)    (0.055) (0.043) (0.006) 
Experience* KS    0.017**     0.014***  
    (0.009)     (0.019)  
Experience*UAI         0.028**  0.098** 
        (0.034)  (0.056) 
Overall R 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.29 0.31 
Wald chi square 99.58*** 127.56*** 145.28*** 116.89*** 117.18*** 138.46*** 151.85*** 126.18*** 160.45*** 167.83*** 
Wald test chi square  24.21*** 15.45** 9.86**  25.89*** 18.42*** 12.11*** 27.67*** 28.146*** 
N MFIs 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 
 
This table tests our hypotheses by using Kogut and Singh’s index (KS) to capture informal institutions.  Models 1 and 5 are the baseline models with linear terms of KS and 
UAI measures, respectively. We test H1 (using KS and UAI measures) and H2 in Models 2 (6) and 3 (7), in which we test for a sigmoid relationship between informal 
differences and MFIs’ performance, respectively, by adding KS and UAI squared terms in Model 2 (6) and KS and UAI cubic terms in Model 3 (7). H3a and H3b are tested 
by introducing the interaction effect of experience on informal institutional differences (KS and UAI measures) as well as on formal institutional differences in Model 4 (8). 
Models 9 and 10 serve as the full models with either KS or UAI measures, respectively. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Standard errors appear in parentheses. The reduced number of MFIs from the original dataset of 405 reflects the missing values subject to list-wise deletion due to factors 









Formal inst. diffs. 1.364 
WVS 1.135 
GLOBE 1.842 
MFI’s cross-border exp. 2.498 
Cross-border MFI 2.967 








Table 5 of Appendix 3 reports the results of variance inflation factors of the baseline models. Testing for 
potential multicollinearity indicates that the maximum variance inflation factor in the full models (Models 9 and 
10) is relatively high (Kleinbaum, Lawrence, Muller, & Nizam, 1998). We can attribute this to multiple 
occurrences of the GLOBE and WVS measures in the independent variables and interactions. Although VIFs 
fell to conventional levels when the quadratic and cubic terms were dropped, we did not find any symptoms of 





Table 1: The frequency and percentage of MFIs in our dataset 
Country Freq. Perc.  Country Freq Perc.  
Albania 15 0.94  Romania 3 0.19  
Argentina 4 0.25  Russian Fed. 58 3.63  
Armenia 11 0.69  Senegal 34 2.13  
Benin 37 2.32  South Africa 14 0.88  
Bolivia 74 4.63  Sri Lanka 1 0.06  
Bosnia Herz. 47 2.94  Tanzania 23 1.44  
Brazil 56 3.5  Togo 13 0.81  
Bulgaria 9 0.56  Trinidad and Tobago 3 0.19  
Burkina Faso 13 0.81  Tunisia 3 0.19  
Cambodia 48 3  Uganda 52 3.25  
Chile 8 0.5  Montenegro 8 0.5  
Colombia 27 1.69  Cameroon 21 1.31  
Dominican Rep. 18 1.13  Guinea 3 0.19  
Ecuador 84 5.26  East Timor 1 0.06  
Egypt 17 1.06  Bangladesh 4 0.25  
El Salvador 25 1.56  Nepal 13 0.81  
Ethiopia 45 2.82  Vietnam 4 0.25  
Georgia 24 1.5  Azerbaijan 32 2  
Guatemala 28 1.75  Mongolia 9 0.56  
Haiti 13 0.81  Nigeria 12 0.75  
Honduras 36 2.25  Mozambique 6 0.38  
India 91 5.69  Tajikistan 20 1.25  
Indonesia 5 0.31  Croatia 4 0.25  
Jordan 12 0.75  Chad 3 0.19  
Kazakhstan 12 0.75  Rwanda 13 0.81  
Kenya 41 2.57  Zambia 4 0.25  
Kyrgyzstan 17 1.06  China 4 0.25  
Madagascar 7 0.44  Serbia 4 0.25  
Mali 11 0.69  Ghana 15 0.94  
Mexico 80 5.01  Malawi 4 0.25  
Moldova 9 0.56  Gambia 4 0.25  
Morocco 32 2  Kosovo 18 1.13  
Nicaragua 53 3.32  Rep. of Congo 3 0.19  
Pakistan 1 0.06  Burundi 3 0.19  
Paraguay 11 0.69  Niger 8 0.5  
Peru 127 7.95  DRC - Kinshasa 4 0.25  
Philippines 18 1.13  
   
 
Table 1 provides information on the proportion of MFIs in our database based on their 





Table 2: Comparing data from MIX Market and rating reports (our data) 
 
Variables     MIX Market (2006), 704 MFIs   Rating reports, 405 
MFIs 
 
Mean   Median   Mean   Median 
 
Age (years)    12   9    9  8 
Total assets (USD)   45,566,650  6,169,918   6,348,701  2,672,081 
Total staff (#)    400   94    85   49 
# Active loan clients   73,564   10,102    12,543   4,878 
Gross loan portfolio (USD)  33,072,688  4,438,677   4,276,508 1,972,629 
Average outstanding loan (USD) 1,026   456    602  387 
 
Table 2 documents the data used in this study, which is based on rating reports from five 
independent rating agencies. For comparison, we have also compared our data to data in the 
publicly available MIX Market database (https://www.themix.org/mixmarket/datasets), 




Table 3. Definition of variables 
 
Variables Explanation/definition Hypotheses 
 
Dependent variables   
 
Financial performance 





Operational net income divided by 
average annual assets and adjusted 









Formal inst. diffs. Indicators 
include business, trade, fiscal, 
and investment, and financial, 
monetary, labor freedom, 
freedom from corruption, 








│EI −EI │/n  
We used principal components factor 
analysis with varimax rotation, which 
produced a single factor score
 
(-) 







orientation, power distance, 




EC kj  – EC km  /n  
We used principal components factor 
analysis with varimax rotation, which 
produced a single factor score 
Sigmoid 
    
WVS Aggregated measures from the  
World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 
2004): traditional authority vs. secular-
rational authority; survival values vs. self-
expression values. We calculated the 
difference between MFI m and its 











MFI’s cross-border exp. 
 
The natural logarithm of the years  
(lagged by one year) since the MFI started 















MFI control variables   
   
Cross-border diversity  
Diversity of MFI’s cross-
border partners’ countries  
1 −  
15
1c




Indicates MFI’s type of cross-border 
alliances in terms of whether (1) the MFI is 
a member of an international network, (2) 
an international partner was active in 
initiating the MFI, and/or (3) the MFI has 
international debt (subsidized or 
commercial) 
Yes=1, No=0  
 
 
Language Indicates whether the MFI has a shared 







Indicates whether the MFI is a shareholder 
firm or a non-profit firm (we grouped 
NGOs and cooperatives under non-profit 
firms and non-bank financial institutions 
and banks under shareholder firms) 

















Human development index 
(HDI) 
A composite country index covering life 
expectancy, education, and income (GDP 
per capita) 
 
   





Table 4: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation matrix  
  
Mean Std. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 ROA 0.02 0.13 1 
            
 
2 Formal inst. diffs. 14.36 11.34 -0.03 1 
           
 
3 KS index 0.46 1.08 -0.07* 0.26* 1 
          
 
4 WVS 5.38 1.31 -0.03 -0.21* 0.32* 1 
         
 
5 GLOBE 2.05 1.35 -0.09 0.03 0.12*  0.23* 1 
        
 
6 UAI 22.79 17.37 -0.22* 0.13* 0.07 -0.21* 0.07* 1 
       
 
7 MFI cross-border exp. 9.22 6.51 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.10* 0.08 0.07 1 
      
 
8 Cross-border MFI 0.74 0.44 0.34 0.14* 0.12* -0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 1 
     
 
9 Cross-border diversity 0.91 1.27 -0.04 0.09 0.24 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.18 0.19 1 
    
 
10 Language 0.26 0.16 0.19*  0.18*  0.20*  0.17 0.08 0.16*  0.07 -0.06 -0.24 1 
   
 
11 Regulation 0.28 0.46 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.09 0.11 0.12 0.15 -0.09*  1 
  
 
12 Assets 6.42 0.59 0.28* -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.09 0.08 0.08* -0.15 0.18 -0.18*  0.13 1 
 
 
13 Type 0.34 0.47 -0.05 -0.04 -0.15* -0.01 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 -0.21* 0.34 -0.04 0.14* 0.15 1  
14 HDI 0.63 0.13 0.11 -0.26 0.23* 0.14* 0.22* 0.29* -0.12* 0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.12* 0.14 1 
 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for variables used in this study. Significance level: two tails (* p<0.01). To save space, the individual 







Table 5: Results of random effects model with ROA as the dependent variable  
 
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Cons -0.48 0.887 0.806 0.217 -0.551 -0.466 -1.987 -0.398 0.528 0.623 
 (0.091) (0.124) (0.071) (0.214) (0.068) (0.173) (0.939) (0.047) (0.055) (0.156) 
Regulation -0.048** -0.047 -0.030* 0.030* -0.033** 0.056 -0.035 0.007 -0.022 -0.037 
 (0.034) (0.024) (0.014) (0.037) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019) 
Type 0.001 0.029 0.003 0.016 0.002 -0.011 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.028) (0.021) (0.006) (0.021) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) 
Assets 0.073** 0.011** 0.072** 0.013** 0.083*** 0.055** 0.006** 0.051** 0.087**   0.062** 
 (0.013) (0.001) (0.013) (0.031) (0.041) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.001) 
Cross-border MFI 0.011 0.069 0.006 0.013 0.01 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.023 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.009) (0.026) (0.022) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018) 
Cross-border diversity -0.035 -0.102** 0.117 -0.045 -0.055 -0.089* 0.102 -0.088 0.168 0.112 
 (0.026) (0.069) (0.075) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.056) (0.073) (0.123) (0.089) 
Language  0.130** 0.059 0.033 0.071 0.117** 0.173 0.246 0.221** 0.278 0.162 
 (0.061) (0.056) (0.033) (0.042) (0.047) (0.046) (0.061) (0.099) (0.072) (0.034) 
HDI -0.015 -0.022 -0.024 0.036 -0.018** -0.078* -0.095 -0.123 0.121 -0.196** 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.018) (0.031) (0.005) (0.024) (0.032) (0.056) (0.078) (0.022) 
Formal inst. diffs. -0.014*** -0.016** -0.041*** -0.071** -0.042** -0.047** -0.026*** -0.082** -0.021*** -0.017*** 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.023) (0.009) (0.024) (0.002) (0.004) 
MFI cross-border exp. 0.013 0.053 0.046* 0.018 0.013* 0.011 0.017* 0.461 0.011 0.015 
 (0.008) (0.024) (0.022) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
GLOBE -1.036** 1.026** 1.435*** -1.386**     1.535**  
 (0.046) (0.071) (0.092) (0.042)     (0.171)  
Square values of GLOBE   -2.001*** -2.751***      -2.852***  
  (0.016) (0.077)      (0.182)  
Cubic values of GLOBE    1.126**      1.061**  
   (0.053)      (0.093)  
49 
 
WVS     -1.019** 1.129*** 1.415*** -0.149**   1.361*** 
     (0.014) (0.051) (0.053) (0.023)  (0.034) 
Square values of WVS      -2.055*** -2.064***   -2.527 
      (0.088) (0.081)   (0.015) 
Quadratic values of WVS       1.116**   
     
1.113** 
       (0.062)   (0.013) 
MFI cross-border exp.* formal inst. diffs.   0.078**    0.066** 0.063** 0.044** 
    (0.014)    (0.017) (0.021) (0.012) 
MFI cross-border exp.* GLOBE    0.076***     0.089**  
    (0.011)     (0.009)  
MFI cross-border exp.* WVS        0.097***   0.021** 
        (0.056)  (0.005) 
Overall R-square 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.32 0.31 
Wald chi-square 107.56*** 128.42*** 150.56*** 139.78*** 103.47*** 128.58*** 138.47*** 131.78*** 175.21*** 168.44*** 
Wald test chi-square   25.94*** 18. 78*** 10.12**  25.13*** 14.67*** 9.88** 28.66*** 25.34*** 
N MFIs 268 268 268 268 290 290 290  290        268 290 
 
Table 5 exhibits the models for testing our hypotheses.  Models 1 and 5 are the baseline models with linear terms of GLOBE and WVS measures, respectively. We test H1 
(using GLOBE and WVS measures) and H2 in Models 2 (6) and 3 (7), in which we test for a sigmoid relationship between informal differences and MFIs’ performance, by 
adding GLOBE and WVS squared terms in Model 2 (6) and GLOBE and WVS cubic terms in Model 3 (7). H3a and H3b are tested by introducing the interaction effect of 
experience on informal institutional differences (GLOBE and WVS measures) as well as on formal institutional differences in Model 4 (8). Models 9 and 10 serve as the full 
models with either GLOBE or WVS measures, respectively. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses. The reduced number of MFIs from the original dataset of 405 reflects the missing values subject to list-wise deletion due to factors such as: use of different 











































Figure 2: Sigmoid effect of informal institutional differences (GLOBE) on MFIs’ performance (Model 9). In 
this figure, the variables of interest (ROA and GLOBE) are represented in standard deviation units, while all 





Figure 3: The moderating effect of cross-border experience on MFIs’ performance (Model 9). This figure 
illustrates how the effect of informal institutional differences on the MFI’s financial position shifts with one 
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